

# Organized Destruction: The Logic of Mass Violence in Genocide

Mevrouw de Rector Magnificus, Mijnheer de Decaan,  
Geachte collega's, beste vrienden, geliefde familie,  
Zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders,

In the summer of 2002, I was visiting my paternal grandmother in the western Turkish city of Bursa. On a hot and lazy afternoon, we were sitting around the living room with the television on, as she sat on the floor, cleaning vegetables for dinner and I was slouched on the sofa zapping through the TV channels. Most of my summer holidays were spent like that, hanging around, joking and chatting. But on that day, a state television channel was broadcasting a debate on the Armenian genocide between various denialist officials. I became interested, stopped zapping, and watched the program for a few minutes. The denialists were all in vigorous agreement that there was no Armenian genocide in 1915. I turned to my grandmother and asked: "Grandma, were there any Armenians in our village?" She looked up and said, "Of course there were Armenians in our region, but the government killed them all in the first year of the war, you didn't know? My mother was standing on the hill in front of our village, she told me all about it. She saw how they threw all the Armenians into the river. Into the Euphrates. Screams and cries. Children and women, old people, everyone. They robbed them of their golden bracelets, their shawls, and silk belts, and threw them into the river." Baffled at her answer, I asked her who threw the Armenians into the river. She looked at me and answered: "Gendarmes of course. The government."

Twenty years after this formative exchange with my illiterate grandmother, it is my honor to stand before you and deliver this inaugural lecture. I will look into three topics: the problems we face in conceptualizing genocide, the findings and challenges of perpetrator research, and my own work on the nearest genocides in Iraq and Syria.

## 1. Genocide concept

Genocide can be defined as a complex process of persecution and destruction of a group of people by a government. In the twentieth century, approximately 60 million defenseless people have become victims of deliberate genocidal policies. The twenty-first century has not begun much better: we are almost a quarter in, and we have already seen genocidal episodes in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, and Iraq. I understand genocide as the organized persecution and destruction of human beings on the basis of their presumed or imputed membership in a group, rather than on their individual properties. Most often, genocide is a product of the fatal combination of extreme power and extreme ideology. Although it makes little sense to quantify genocide, it is clear that a genocidal process always concerns a society at large, and that genocide often destroys a significant and often critical part of the affected communities. I do not discriminate between the types of groups that are being targeted: ethnic, religious, regional, political, sexual, etc. It can be argued that genocidal processes are particularly malicious and destructive because they are group-selective: directed against all members of a group, mostly innocent and defenseless people who are targeted and killed regardless of their behavior. Genocide always denotes a colossal and brutal collective criminality. For this reason, it is a phenomenon that is distinct from other forms of mass violence such as war, civil war, or massacre – yet it is not unique, and I will return to this.

Any discussion on genocide starts with Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish lawyer who lost dozens of family members in the Holocaust and dedicated his life to the criminalization of genocide under international law. In 1944, he defined genocide as: "A coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of

such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups.” The essence of Lemkin’s definition was organized group destruction, and each of these three terms are vital to an understanding of genocide. But Lemkin was not alone in thinking about human destructiveness in this period: Hersh Lauterpacht and Norbert Elias were other great minds who had theorized, in their own way, the problem of human catastrophes. It was no coincidence that many of these thinkers were Central European Jews who reflected not only on the European cataclysm of 1914 to 1945, but also on long traditions of anti-Semitic prejudice, persecution, and violence.

After Lemkin, the concept seemed to become a dead letter. But historians and social scientists rediscovered it and published the first academic studies of genocide. Ever since, the number of publications about genocide has grown and nowadays, genocide studies is a respectable academic specialism, with its own journals and research institutes across the world. It is an eminently multi-disciplinary and therefore challenging field, since genocide cannot be fully fathomed through only one discipline. Whereas the first generation of genocide scholars has set a solid foundation, successive, younger cohorts of researchers have taken the concept further. They have broken taboos, charted new paths, and opened fresh vistas. Although no justice can be done to this rich field in this brief and necessarily incomplete overview, there are three issues that continue to provoke thought in the field.

The first issue is encapsulated in the title of our institute: War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies. How does genocide relate to war? And how does it relate to the Holocaust? Genocide is distinct, but not unique, and contextualizing genocide in the broader literature on war, civil war, and political violence remains relevant. In 2012, Scott Straus argued that “the study of genocide should be embedded in a broader study of political violence; the two literatures have been strangely cloistered from each other”. His argument is still valid: there is a serious disconnect between the discussions in genocide studies and in other fields. Genocide studies is too self-referential and treats the violence of genocide as unique and separate from, say, massacres against non-combatants in civil wars. War studies and genocide studies can make gains if they relate to each other and engage with each other’s arguments.

Then the relationship between Holocaust and Genocide, the two terms that constitute this academic chair. In 2012, NIOD published a concise book with the title *The Holocaust and Other Genocides*. Around the same time, Donald Bloxham published a book with a slightly different title: *The Final Solution: A Genocide*, which critiques the restricted understanding of uniqueness that has set the Holocaust apart from history and raised barriers to a better understanding of it. These types of recent studies by colleagues such as Dirk Moses, Dan Stone, and Mark Levene contextualize the Holocaust in the much wider history and memory of European genocide and ethnic cleansing. This trend has contributed to a better understanding of the Shoah, and a more equitable production and distribution of knowledge. Some genocides have received much less attention in public awareness and academic literature than they should have. An equitable arrangement is not only needed for moral fairness, but also for substantial reasons: no understanding of human destructiveness should rely disproportionately on European, or well-documented, or thoroughly-studied genocides only. Every genocide is unique. But our task as scholars is to go beyond uniqueness, to deepen our empirical knowledge of the Holocaust and simultaneously broaden our understanding of it through comparison and integration in genocide studies. This is not a zero-sum process but a multi-directional and intersectional one, because the Shoah will remain our moral and historical cornerstone. Whenever I wonder, how did it feel to be persecuted, I turn to the diary of Viktor Klemperer. When I gather my courage and enter the grim world of the *Sonderkommando*, I pick up the memoirs of Shlomo Venezia. When I try to understand how doctors could get involved in mass murder, I listen to Elie Cohen. And to gain insight into the effects of survival, look no further than Imre Kertesz.

Second, the problematic nature of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, according to which, “genocide means to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, or religious group.” Lemkin’s efforts have often been portrayed as heroic (right here in Amsterdam, there is even a street named after him), and the Convention as an unqualified success. But both suffer from a number of drawbacks. First off, as a child of his era, Lemkin viewed cultures as immutable, was affected by methodological nationalism, and he was close to anti-Soviet lobbyists in the United States. Furthermore, as a crude legal imposition on a deeply complex political and sociological process, the convention imputes motive and homogenizes intent, compartmentalizes a process into isolated acts, leaves certain groups unmentioned, and misconstrues the imagined nature of human groups.

And much more seriously, the Convention is a product and possibly victim of Cold War politics. We now know that Stalin went through the draft convention personally, striking out elements deemed harmful to the Soviet Union and emphasizing those that could potentially be used against the West. He argued against the establishment of an international criminal court and crucially, against the inclusion of political groups among those protected by the convention. Deeply aware of the potential of self-incrimination, he excluded political groups out of expediency, because well, he had been killing a good number of them. Ever since, violent repression of domestic political opposition has not caught the attention of genocide scholars. What was left then was a gutted Convention that Lemkin himself was unhappy with, and should not be an object of veneration, but an object of critique. Surely, we should not be working with Stalin’s definition of genocide.

My third point follows from this last problem. In the global history of genocide, there are ample examples of the mass killings of political groups, or a collective political identity with the aim of permanently erasing that identity. Whether it was “Kulaks” under Stalin, “Monarchists” under Pol Pot, or “Communists” under Suharto, the victims were indiscriminately killed, and could not be redeemed through re-education or relinquishing their political identities. We are dealing here with the essentialization or ‘racialization’ of political identities as indelible and even hereditary. Research on the 1965 Indonesian genocide, for example, strongly suggests that there were negative consequences for children of victims. Discrimination and stigmatization of former Communists and their families continued for decades, as the Suharto regime viewed affiliation with the left as a sin of inheritance. A child of a Communist was seen as a Communist. This means that the way a political category is imagined by the perpetrators is quintessentially ‘ethnic’: a bounded community that subjectively see themselves and are seen and treated as a distinct group. Whether these abstract social and political groups can objectively be seen as a group is irrelevant; ethnicity after all is also a social construct. If the genocides under Suharto and Stalin demonstrate anything, it is how violent imaginaries in the minds of the perpetrators can produce abstract social and political groups that go beyond nominal and visible ethnic markers.

## **2. Perpetrator research**

In 1961, the prominent Dutch novelist Harry Mulisch traveled to Jerusalem to witness and report the trial of Nazi officer Adolf Eichmann in what became his book *Criminal Case 40/61*. Exactly 60 years ago today, on 23 September 1961, from a hotel room in Warsaw, Mulisch pondered the admixture of killing and success for Eichmann: “So what must the murder of the Jews mean for Eichmann? Linked up with the power, the status, the uniform, the car with chauffeur, the mistresses, the *Schnapps*, the parties, and of course the beautiful things he saw: the cities, Budapest, the music he heard, his children – but *naturally* tears come to his eyes, with emotion and nostalgia when thinking back to the days of the gas chambers.” Mulisch was ahead of his time in posing this vital question in our research field: genocide ends the lives of the victims, but what does it mean for the perpetrators themselves? And he was pretty close in his answer.

Ever since Christopher Browning published his seminal book *Ordinary Men*, the field of perpetrator research has grown immensely to include more cases, topics, and disciplines. We now have a *Perpetrator Studies Network* and a burgeoning *Journal of Perpetrator Research*. In my own work, I shift the perspective from the study of merely perpetrators to perpetration. Whereas perpetrator refers to the agency of the individuals who commit mass violence against civilians, perpetration refers to the process of collective production of mass violence. This processual view enables us to cater for the complexity of the process of perpetration: different layers of authority, different motives of involvement, different types of social ties, and changes in these factors over time.

I approach perpetration as a socio-ecological model containing three distinct analytical levels: top level (architects), mid-level (organizers), and bottom level (killers). I also use a temporal, processual approach focusing on the power relationships between perpetrators and victims, but also among the perpetrators – before, during, and after the violence. These three contextual layers are not simply piled on top of each other, but the largest contexts are often preconditions for the smallest ones. Without the macro context of the radicalization of the political elites, the violent measures against the victims would not have been conceived by mid-management, and ultimately countless individual perpetrators would not have murdered individual victims in intimate situations of killing.

Within this model, the mid-level has been most persistently occupying me: how do otherwise neutral and technocratic institutions and agencies in a given state and society become involved in genocide? This framework allows us to proceed beyond the dichotomy of situation versus disposition. So, we are developing new methods of approaching perpetrators, for example by conducting discreet interviews with perpetrators in ongoing processes of violence. We even ask perpetrators to write down their thoughts and feelings, and we use digital methods such as social media data, and video materials. Digitization impacts everything from documentation to research, and even the performance of violence itself. I will show an example of a Syrian perpetrator a bit later.

Mass violence nowadays is broadcast online in real time. Perpetrators have smartphones, and they film clips of violence against civilians: torture, bombardments, and individual as well as mass executions. They create ‘trophy videos’, or livestream violence designed to spread terror. These kinds of footage are of fundamental importance for studying mass violence and the role of perpetrators, a) because this type of footage is rare and often unique, and b) because those who commit the crimes are prominently visible. Never before had we been able to observe the actions of perpetrators of collective violence as closely as we do now. Never before had we been able to look the perpetrator straight in his face while he, camera in the one hand and weapon in the other, shoots someone in the head and makes a selfie in the meantime.

Researching contemporary perpetrators has two major benefits: avoiding the influence of legal prosecution after the violence, and avoiding the influence of hindsight many years later. Browning struggled with this, and colleagues working on Yugoslavia or Rwanda do too. Even if they operate in different cultural contexts, the genocidal situation is universal; everywhere, power grows out of the barrel of a gun or the handle of a machete. These new approaches also lead to new concepts. For example, we developed the notion of ‘proto-perpetrator’: those who are primed for violence, steeped in collective hatred, and laced with impunity, well before any killings are underway. Speaking to these people, you realize with a faint sense of fatalism, that if and when hell breaks loose, it is they who will be at the forefront of perpetration. Or think of the notion of the ‘almost-perpetrator’: those who edged close to perpetration but veered away from it, last minute. They were tempted, looked into the abyss, but decided for various reasons it was unconscionable, and walked away, to be faced often with ostracism and isolation. Paths not taken tell us a lot about perpetration.

Despite all these accomplishments, there are limits to academic research: perpetration is a dark room, a muted space, and part of it will remain a mystery. Accounting for the silences in the field requires innovative and unconventional thinking. Where our academic methods end, our cultural imagination has to fill in. I am thinking here of movies, such as

*Katyń* or *Son of Saul*, which depict the atrocities in brutal clarity. But also of literature, such as Vassili Grossman's masterpiece *Life and Fate*, or Jonathan Littell's *The Kindly Ones* about an SS officer involved in the Holocaust in the Soviet Union. These are admirable efforts that offer disturbing but important insights into those aspects of perpetration that are difficult to reach through scholarly methods.

### 3. Nearest genocides

The Middle East is often portrayed as synonymous with violence. Media representation and popular imagination tend to converge on the a-historical notion that Middle Eastern states and societies are inherently violent. This is wrong, and mass violence in the region must be approached as a historical and sociological problem, relating to processes of state building, nation building, and authoritarian politics in the postcolonial era that have caused strong changes. I will utilize my tenure of this chair to try to understand how and why Syria and Iraq became such violent societies and to examine the causes, courses, and consequences of mass political violence in the region. This collaborative project takes a panoramic and in-depth look into the rise of the Baathist regimes in Damascus and Baghdad, and the almost limitless violence they visited upon their societies in the past half century. Through a combination of archival research, oral history, digital methods, and ethnographic fieldwork, we examine the history and dynamic of mass violence in these two societies. We look at the prison system, the emergence of pro-government militias, and intercommunal relations in cities and neighborhoods.

The relevance of these particular societies is manifold. First, they cannot be narrowly conceived as only Middle Eastern history, but can clarify a range of issues in violence research, from perpetration to victimization, polarization and reconciliation, religiosity and secularism, mobilization and demobilization, organized crime and human trafficking, and many other topics. Therefore, Iraqi and Syrian history is vitally important for the global history of war and genocide, and fits the mandate of NIOD like nothing else. In fact, my emphatic advice to future students of mass violence is: learn Arabic and study these countries. Second, the Iraqi and Syrian catastrophes are nearest to us. Nearest in space (they border Europe; there used to be a direct KLM flight to Aleppo), nearest in time (the violence is ongoing right now), and nearest socially (Iraqis and Syrians are and will remain among us and become a part of us, here in Europe and beyond). I am omitting the direct Dutch and broader European political and military involvement in the conflicts, and e.g. the fact that it was a Dutch businessman who sold Saddam Hussein chemicals in the 1980s. If only for reasons of proximity it is imperative that we research and teach the violence in Syria and Iraq. Not through the reductive and racist prisms of terrorism or refugees, but through the perspective of the manifold forms of mass violence ordinary Syrians and Iraqis witnessed, suffered, survived, resisted, and perpetrated.

The historical context of much of this violence is rooted in the long aftermath of Ottoman collapse, and massive population transfers and genocides during that process. Between the mass expulsion of the Circassians in the 1860s and the Yezidi genocide of 2014, lays a wide spectrum of mass violence in the post-Ottoman space. Most centrally the 1915 genocide of Armenians and Assyrians, but also in Dersim in 1938 (in which my own family was victimized), colonial violence in the mandates, Cold War violence, the massacre in Srebrenica, and post-colonial genocides.

Violence in Iraq and Syria is a product of this historical context, which led to parallel developments of genocidal regimes: Saddam Hussein's in Iraq, and Hafez al-Assad's in Syria. The establishment, perpetuation, and collapse of these twin regimes was accompanied with exceptional levels of violence. This violence was episodic (e.g. in Saddam's 1980s Anfal campaign against the Kurds, or Assad's obliteration of the city of Hama around the same time), but also systemic, in the expansive prison system and torture archipelago in both Assad's and Saddam's Gulag. Indeed, some of the worst atrocities occurred in the concealed

compartments of mass torture and execution in prisons. Our forthcoming book *Syrian Gulag: Assad's Prisons 1970-2020* examines this systemic violence.

Let us finally turn to Syria.

The conflict in Syria has now dragged on for over a decade. Some 600,000 people have been killed, millions more injured, maimed, and traumatized, 12 million people (half of the pre-war population) are displaced inside and outside the country, and the economic infrastructure and civic life of the country are devastated. The uprising began in 2011 as an overwhelmingly non-violent mass movement, to which the Assad regime responded violently, rapidly militarizing the conflict and brutalizing society. The totality of violence can be separated into armed struggle between military factions on the one hand, and a wide range of mass violence against civilians on the other. This conceptual distinction between warfare and war crimes is not always hermetic but is nevertheless crucial to drawing distinctions between the various forms of violence. Although the fighting of course claimed many combatants, the bulk of civilians died at the hands of the regime.

The Assad regime disposes over an extensive and very well-equipped coercive apparatus, which consists of four major pillars: the army, the intelligence agencies, the special forces, and the militias.

First, the standing army is the institution least associated with regime, evidenced by the mass desertions of conscript soldiers and even occasionally (high-ranking) officers. Even so, certain army divisions and especially loyalist air force pilots have committed deliberate violence against civilian targets on a massive scale. This includes the use of chemical weapons in 2013 and beyond. Therefore, much like the myth of the 'clean Wehrmacht', the Syrian Army is in no way irreproachable. Still, the perpetrator groups more centrally and effectively involved in the targeting of civilians were the other three groups.

Starting with the prime responsible, the "Mukhabarat" – a general term in the Arab world for the intelligence agencies, or secret police. Since 1970, Hafez al-Assad built his intelligence empire with four main services: State Security, Political Security, Military Intelligence, and the Air Force Intelligence. They cover partially overlapping and often conflicting powers, areas, and jurisdictions, and all of them operate nationwide prisons and detention centers where torture is routinely applied against detainees. The Syrian Mukhabarat are distinguished from many of their counterparts elsewhere, primarily by their broad powers to use force against Syrian citizens. Like others, they wiretap and spy on people, but they also threaten, manipulate, arrest, imprison, and execute – mostly without warrants or due process. Their branches and prisons are characterized by systematic, extensive, and brutal torture conducted by professionals, who have tortured detainees to death on a large scale. The man presiding over this empire of death is Ali Mamlouk, always discreetly in Assad's shadow but architect of his murderous bureaucracy. Exactly how murderous these policies were, was exposed by a defector code-named Caesar who leaked photos of the Air Force Intelligence branch in Damascus. I will spare you these photos, you can find them online, but they demonstrated the industrial and methodical nature of the regime's extermination of detainees.

Third are the different elite forces and shock troops that are highly trained and well-equipped, and that form the core of the regime's assault capacity. There is the Fourth Armored Division, the Special Mission Forces, the Tiger Forces, or the Republican Guard – a praetorian guard charged with protecting the regime. Under the leadership of officers such as Ali Khizam (1966-2012) or Issam Zahreddin (1961-2017), the Republican Guard rampaged through Syria and committed countless atrocities, such as sieges, human shields, and mass executions. In an interesting coincidence, at the same time that Khizam was laying waste to the city of Homs in 2012, Jonathan Littell had snuck into the city to observe the violence for his riveting report, *Syrian Notebooks*.

Fourth and final are the paramilitary groups, in the Syrian vernacular called "Shabbiha", a catch-all category for irregular militias linked to the regime. From 2011 on, they carried out storming of neighborhoods, dispersion of demonstrations, as well as property crimes, torture, kidnapping, assassination, and massacres. The highest ranks of the Assad regime stubbornly washed their hands in innocence: the militias allegedly acted on their own

volition, and the government ostensibly did not direct or empower them. These types of familiar mechanisms of moral distancing and plausible deniability were deliberately planted so that the violence could not be traced back to the official authorities. I have dealt with this phenomenon in our VIDI project and in my book *Paramilitarism*. But it was clear that the Assad regime was surreptitiously in charge of the Shabbiha and remote-controlled them through its extensive patronage system. Even the Shabbiha's own slogan was: "We are the state". My forthcoming book *Assad's Militias* will offer an in-depth analysis of their emergence, crimes, and aftermath.

These coercive structures indicate, first and foremost, that the Assad regime commands an apparatus with extraordinary destructive potential. This apparatus was spawned to produce and destroy enemies, and well before 2011, there were thousands of perpetrators within these institutions ready to kill. And if there is one image that captures the intricacies of this system, it is the following photo from 2017.



The man in the black jacket giving a pep talk to the troops is the implacable hardliner Jamil al-Hassan, longtime head of the Air Force Intelligence, a grim organization that in and of itself was responsible for immense levels of violence against Syrians. Standing next to him in the brown jacket is Suheil al-Hassan (not family), commander of the Tiger Forces, an elite force that ran a scorched-earth campaign while retaking territory that the regime had lost. Then notice the chubby and tattered man on the left with his chest hair out is Ali al-Shilli, commander of a Shabbiha militia of hundreds of men that committed arrests, killings, kidnappings, sexual violence, and plunder, in central Syria. Ali al-Shilli has a popular Facebook page, through which we contacted him and interviewed him about his acts. This is what he had to say for himself:

“Of course, I have a bit of a difficult background. I used to love weapons, love trouble. This is basically my nature... Yes, we killed and kidnapped and have done things that shouldn't be done, but we did not kill anyone innocent.”

This photo gets to my central argument of how war and genocide intersect, how perpetration is a collective effort, and how a political category can be deliberately and indiscriminately

attacked. These three men represent, in the hierarchy, different perpetrator groups that pursue their own goals and perpetrate different forms of violence, but nevertheless contribute to the organized destruction of an imagined target group. Together, they are a conglomerate committing violence so large-scale, deadly, deliberate, systematic, persistent, and group-selective, that only a purposeful policy of annihilation can explain it. The victims are an explicitly political group that are seen as irredeemable and can only be dealt with through elimination. It is our task to understand that process of annihilation by documenting, researching, and teaching it.

## **A word of thanks**

Dear friends and colleagues, I would like to end with a word of gratitude.

When I first came to the University of Amsterdam in 2003, I was shy, dressed badly, and sported a beard like a paramilitary. People were afraid of me: who is this weird guy talking about creepy topics all day? But it all ended well.

To the boards of the KNAW and the College van Bestuur, the boards of the Faculty of Humanities and the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies goes my deep gratitude for extending the trust to appoint me. I find this university a congenial environment in which to contribute to the best of my ability. I truly consider this chair a position of trust, a *vertrouwenspositie*, and will treat it as such, with sensitivity and equanimity.

Working at the intersections of such a broad research field means that I have incurred many professional and personal debts over the years. I would like to mention a number of people without side-lining any of the others. I have had the privilege to benefit from a great number of inspiring individuals, starting with Ton Zwaan, who took me in and mentored me generously.

My former colleagues at Utrecht University have been very supportive in the past decade, especially Ido and Jolle, and Susanne of the JPR. With Ayhan, Iva, and Amir we completed a great project and I'm thankful for their intellectual companionship.

Now, I have joined the unique community of the NIOD Institute in Amsterdam. From the days of Wichert to the era of Frank and now Martijn, I have enjoyed the collegiality and friendship of all NIOD colleagues, especially Thijs, Nanci, Laurien, Karel, Peter, and Ismee. What has made this institution such an inviting place to work is the personal attention given to work-life balance, a privilege that only makes for better academics and better humans.

A special thanks also goes out to someone who is no longer among us: in 2005, I visited the Aktion Reinhard camps during a formative trip led by Sobibór survivor Jules Schelvis. His dignified position and pedagogical attitude was really inspiring.

I already said this work is by no means an individual effort or achievement; in the best possible tradition of civic science, I am lucky to be working with a terrific group of Syrian (and by now Syrian-Dutch) researchers, to document, examine, and teach about this difficult topic. They include Ali, Jaber, Kanfash and of course Annsar. *Shukran ktir ilkun.*

Thank you also to the alumni and the students, each and every year a very special group, and I am very grateful for their enthusiasm, commitment, and input.

Finally, a very special thanks to my many friends, and to my family: my dad, my mom, Polat amca and hala, my sister Devran, and my wife Ayşenur.

*Ik heb gezegd.*